|
Turkey rethinks the Kurdish question
29.6.2009
By Ranj Alaaldin
|
|
|
|
Once
Turkey's achilles heel, the Kurds could become its
greatest asset, a buffer against an unstable Iraq
and an ascendant Iran.
June
29, 2009
Once Turkey's achilles heel, the Kurds could become
its greatest asset, a buffer against an unstable
Iraq and an ascendant Iran
Recent overtures by Turkey towards Kurds within and
beyond its borders signify a major policy shift from
Ankara.
|
Ranj Alaaldin is a political researcher and analyst
specialising in the Middle East. |
Domestically, Turkish president Abdullah Gul has
declared the Kurdish question to be the "country's
most pressing problem", while across the border in
the Iraqi Kurdish Capital city of Erbil, a
conference in February brought together more than
100 officials and academics from both Turkey and the
Kurdistan region of Iraq. More notable still is that
Gul recently visited Iraq and met Nechirvan Barzani,
prime minister of the Kurdistan Regional Government
(KRG) – the first time a Turkish leader has formally
met an official from the Kurdish government.
With more than 25 million Kurds straddled across
borders between Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Syria, and
with no state of their own, there is still some way
to go for a complete resolution to the Kurdish
problem. Turkey's engagement with the KRG and
attempts at properly and openly addressing its own
Kurdish problem for the first time is nevertheless
substantial progress.
More promising still is when the head of Turkey's
traditionally anti-Kurdish military, General Ilker
Basbug, speaks of a need to tackle the Kurdish
problem from its social and economic roots or states
that "even a terrorist is a human being". This is,www.ekurd.net
after
all, the same Turkish state that has historically
denied the existence of the Kurdish identity and
suppressed Kurdish human and civil rights and that
has fought a domestic battle with the Turkish-born,
but Kurdish, guerrilla organisation the PKK*,
resulting in more than 30,000 deaths.
Similarly, relations with neighbouring Iraqi Kurds
have historically been marked by distrust and heated
exchanges as a consequence of issues related to KRG
autonomy, its ambitions to annex oil-rich Kirkuk
(which the Turks consider the economic engine of any
future Kurdish state) and as a result of countless
Turkish military incursions into KRG territory in
pursuit of suspected PKK targets. Turkey as recently
as 2007 refused to recognise and engage with the
KRG.
Now, however, geopolitical realities demand the
cultivation of new relations to meet new challenges.
By taking genuine steps to remedy its internal
Kurdish problem – for example by establishing a
24-hour state-run Kurdish broadcasting station –
Turkey takes itself towards stability, prosperity
and eventual EU accession. But it also lays an
otherwise difficult-to-lay foundation on which to
build a sustainable relationship of mutual interests
with the KRG – one based on security and strategic
co-operation, and which counters the increasing
reach of Iran.
The KRG offers Ankara the opportunity to counter
Iranian expansionism without embarking upon the
costly endeavour of alienating Tehran: Turkey is
heavily reliant on Iran for its energy needs (Iran
provides a fifth of Turkey's natural gas) and is
enjoying a growing economic partnership expected to
take Turkish-Iranian trade to $20bn in the next two
years.
By building on the economic opportunities already
exploited by about 500 Turkish companies currently
operating in the relatively stable resource-rich
Kurdish region, Turkey creates an axis of secularism
with the KRG that acts as a buffer against
instability in the rest of Iraq.
Through this axis, Turkey firstly secures its
counterweight against Iranian expansionism and
secondly aborts the birth of an independent Kurdish
state (making way, as a result, for compromise over
issues like Kirkuk). Moreover, as the protector of
land-locked Iraqi Kurdistan, Turkey simultaneously
guarantees its access to the region's huge reserves
of oil and gas and increases its diplomatic clout.
The KRG, as a result of this guarantee of long-term
inviolability, increased diplomatic and economic
co-operation and unwavering Turkish support for
Kurdish oil exports, benefits from increased foreign
investment, technological expertise and access to
the European markets that Turkey could offer as a
transit country – something Iran could not offer and
something that Baghdad would otherwise successfully
impede.
Turkey of course still has the option of choosing
Baghdad over the Kurds to secure its foreign policy
interests or it could forge an alliance with both;
indeed, its nationalist establishment may still
prefer the hardline stance towards the KRG,www.ekurd.net
believing this will force it to give up the PKK (see
agreement between Iraq and Turkey). But Turkey and
its military establishment, which have a greater
fear of Islamic Iran than the isolated PKK, no
longer have the benefit of choice. Turkey has
already lost its Baghdad pawn to Tehran, which
trained, armed and funds the ruling Shia parties.
Turkish-Kurdish history and the complexities of the
Middle East might, at first sight, suggest no end to
the impasse between Turk and Kurd. But time is
running out for Turkey. Uncertainty and concern, the
two hallmarks of the Turkish-Kurdish relationship,
could transform the Kurds, historically Turkey's
achilles heel, into its greatest asset amid an
uncertain post-Saddam region witnessing decreased
western influence and a rising, intransigent,
controllable, but not stoppable Iran.
Ranj Alaaldin is a political researcher and
analyst specialising in the Middle East. He visits
the region regularly and as part of his recent work
on Iraq has visited the country on a number of
fact-finding missions. He holds qualifications from
the London School of Economics and Political
Science.
Copyright, respective
author or news agency,
guardian co.uk
* Since 1984 the Turkey's Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK) took up arms for self-rule in the mainly
Kurdish southeast of Turkey (Turkey-Kurdistan). A
large Turkey's Kurdish community openly sympathise
with the Kurdish PKK rebels. Turkey refuses to
recognize its Kurdish population as a distinct
minority.
The PKK demanded Turkey's recognition of the Kurds'
identity in its constitution and of their language
as a native language along with Turkish in the
country's Kurdish areas,
the party also demanded an end to ethnic
discrimination in Turkish laws and constitution
against Kurds, ranting them full political freedoms.
The PKK is considered a 'terrorist' organization by
Ankara, U.S., the PKK continues to be on the
blacklist list in EU despite court ruling which
overturned a decision
to place the Kurdish rebel group PKK and its
political wing on the European Union's terror list.
Turkey refuses to recognize its Kurdish population
as a distinct minority. It has allowed some cultural
rights such as limited broadcasts in the Kurdish
language and private Kurdish language courses with
the prodding of the European Union,www.ekurd.net
but Kurdish politicians
say the measures fall short of their expectations.
**
Kurds are not recognized as an official minority in
Turkey and are denied rights granted to other
minority groups. Under EU pressure, Turkey recently
granted Kurds limited rights for broadcasts and
education in the Kurdish language, but critics say
the measures do not go far enough.
The use of the term "Kurdistan" is vigorously
rejected due to its alleged political implications
by the Republic of Turkey, which does not recognize
the existence of a "Turkish Kurdistan" Southeast
Turkey.
Others estimate over 40 million Kurds live in Big
Kurdistan (Iraq, Turkey, Syria, Iran, Armenia),
which covers an area as big as France, about half of
all Kurds which estimate to 25 million live in
Turkey. A large
Turkey's Kurdish community openly sympathise with
the Kurdish PKK for a Kurdish homeland in the
country's mainly Kurdish southeast of Turkey.
Before August 2002, the Turkish government placed
severe restrictions on the use of Kurdish language,
prohibiting the language in education and broadcast
media. The Kurdish alphabet is still not recognized
in Turkey, and use of the Kurdish letters X, W, Q
which do not exist in the Turkish alphabet has led
to judicial persecution in 2000 and 2003
The Kurdish flag flown officially in Iraqi Kurdistan
but unofficially flown by Kurds in Armenia. The flag
is banned in Iran, Syria, and Turkey where flying it
is a criminal offence"
Southeastern Turkey:
North Kurdistan (
Kurdistan-Turkey)
wikipedia
Top |
Kurd Net
does not take credit for and is not responsible for the content of news
information on this page
|
®