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Election Imbroglio in Iraqi Kurdistan
23.2.2010
By Denise Natali |
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Analysis
of the 2010 Iraqi Parliamentary Elections.
February
23, 2010
The
forthcoming Iraqi parliamentary elections are as
much a competition between rival Kurdish parties as
they are an attempt for the Kurdistan Regional
Government (KRG) to assure its representation in
Baghdad. The expanded arena in which electoral
politics are unwinding, unsettled scores between
Kurdish factions, and declining Kurdish leverage in
Iraq have heightened internal divisions while
reinforcing the need for “a unified Kurdish voice.”
Opposition politics in the Kurdish North also has
renewed uncertainty over the power-sharing
arrangement between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)
and the |
Denise Natali is the Academic
Dean of Students and Research Centers Director at
the American University of Iraq-Sulaimaniyah,
Kurdistan region. |
Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). If the
politically fragmented PUK does not pull its weight
in securing seats for the Kurdistani List,
particularly in Kirkuk and the disputed territories,
it will become further disempowered. Election
outcomes will likely influence governance in the
Kurdistan region and, to some extent, the dynamic
between Erbil and Baghdad.
Like
the 2005 electoral campaign, one of the key issues
for the Kurds is how to allocate seats in the
parliament and organize votes. Although the amended
election law increased the total number of
parliamentary seats from 275 to 325, the percentage
of seats allocated to the Kurdistan Region, which is
based on the food ration cards issued by the Iraqi
Ministry of Trade, did not rise proportionately. A
Kurdish delegation to Baghdad demanded 21 percent of
total seats for the Kurdistan Region, or forty-eight
seats; however, the Iraqi parliament accepted
forty-three. This allocation not only reflects
declining Kurdish influence in Iraq, but also the
rifts that have become increasingly apparent between
the Kurdish elites and their parties, and local
populations.
A key thorn in the representation debate is the
oil-rich province of Kirkuk, which, after much
Kurdish lobbying, has been included in the election
process—it was excluded from the April 2009
provincial council elections because of a dispute
over population figures. The problem of which
population figures to rely on remains controversial
in the parliamentary elections. Arab communities
wanted to use the 2004 voter registry, the Turcomans
the 1957 registry, and the Kurds the 2009 records.
The Kurds also opposed ethnic quotas and quadrants,
favoring instead keeping Kirkuk as a single
electoral district. Arabs and Turcomans, however,
wanted a four-district division that would give them
some plurality in the city center. The election law
eventually accepted Kirkuk as a single district,www.ekurd.netwith
voting based on present population figures. Even if
the current situation appears to support a Kurdish
plurality, the Kurds have no guarantee that the
Kirkuk vote will ultimately work in their favor. The
final votes will be subject to a special review to
verify if there has been “an unusual increase in
registered voters,” which may lead to additional
uncertainties in election outcomes and renewed
tensions between the KRG and the central government.
The real election imbroglio, however, is rooted in
opposition politics in the Kurdish North. The Gorran
(Change) movement, which has an important stake in
the election with over 170 candidates in eight Iraqi
provinces, continues to challenge the KDP-PUK
duopoly. Gorran, a new movement that split from the
PUK and won 25 seats in the Iraqi Kurdistan
parliamentary elections last July, is concentrating
most of its efforts on winning Kirkuk, a traditional
PUK stronghold, and is working hard to capture
disaffected Kurdish, Arab, and Turcoman votes. PUK
leader and Iraqi president Jalal Talabani is
campaigning against the popular local Gorran member
Mam Rostam, underlining the fragility of the PUK
power-base in Kirkuk. The KDP and the PUK have not
been particularly tolerant of the Gorran challenge.
Political intimidation against Gorran members
continues, despite the edict against such activities
issued by Iraqi Kurdistan president Massoud Barzani.
To date, no official investigations have been made
against the violence, harassment, and death of
Gorran members, which has further raised criticism
of the Kurdistan Regional Government and its two
main parties.
A potential further challenge to the KDP and PUK
monopolization of power stems from changes in the
voting system. Under the previous closed-list
elections, the KDP and PUK could pre-determine how
they would share seats in a district by negotiating
the order of candidates on the joint list. If voters
take advantage of the new open list system,
seat-sharing between the two parties cannot be
predetermined, because voters need not vote for
straight party lists. Rather, they can cast votes
for individual candidates, making it impossible for
parties to negotiate ahead of time how seats will be
apportioned between them. To capture the largest
number of votes in each region, the two parties have
placed their own representatives in traditional
power centers; the KDP in Dohuk, the PUK in
Suleimaniyah, and both in Erbil. While this
arrangement may reaffirm the KDP support base, it
has placed the PUK in the uncomfortable position of
having to win votes in areas where it has lost
substantial support to Gorran.
These issues have implications for internal
governance and KRG relations with Baghdad. The
elections are a litmus test for the viability of the
strategic agreement and power-sharing among the
various political, ethnic, and religious groups in
the Kurdistan Region. Unless the PUK pulls its
weight in Sulaimaniya and the disputed territories,
it will become an even greater political burden for
the KDP, which may find it less interesting or
necessary to share power and revenues on a 50-50
basis. Gorran may be strategically placed to fill
the PUK void; however, it still needs to consolidate
its power base in the North. Unless Gorran
transforms itself into an alternative party offering
pragmatic solutions, rather than simply trying to
capture voters dissatisfied with the PUK, the region
could become a one-party quasi-state under the
auspices of the KDP and the Barzani family.
Election outcomes also could affect the dialogue
between Erbil and Baghdad. Gorran expects to win at
least fifteen seats in the Iraqi parliament and to
use its opposition role to influence politics in
Baghdad. With Gorran’s “conditional” commitment to a
unified Kurdish voice and no individual likely to
receive more than twenty seats, opportunities may
arise for coalition building between Gorran and
other Iraqi entities. According to the Movement for
Change representative Hama Towfiq, “We have made it
clear that we will not blindly support the KRG in
Baghdad, particularly on essential Kurdish
nationalist issues: the budget, peshmerga forces,
and the hydrocarbons law.” Gorran has affirmed that
it will support the Kurdistani List in the central
government only if the KRG spends its budget in a
transparent way, the Kurdish peshmerga forces are
unified and not based on party militias, and
conditions and information about the hydrocarbon
law, including contracts with oil companies are made
public.
Still, even if Gorran wins Kirkuk and key Kurdish
areas, it may have insufficient leverage to bargain
on Kurdish nationalist interests in Baghdad. It can
challenge the Kurdistani List on essential issues
such as corruption and transparency and engage in
back-door bargaining between Kurdish and Iraqi
parties. Yet Gorran has to reaffirm its commitment
to the Kurdistan Region as a means of assuring
popular support in the North. Any potential
political deals are unlikely to lead to major shifts
on key issues such as the budget, the hydrocarbon
law, or Kirkuk and the disputed territories. Greater
fragmentation could actually encourage more
political bottlenecks in Baghdad and between the
Kurdish parties. At minimum, the election results
will further blur the lines between Kurdish
nationalism, political expediency, and economic
opportunism.
Denise Natali is the Academic Dean of Students and
Research Centers Director at the American University
of Iraq-Sulaimaniyah, Kurdistan region.
Copyright, respective author or news agency,
Carnegieendowment org
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